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1What do Citizens Communicate about during Crises? Analyzing Twitter Use 
during the 2011 UK Riots
Abstract
The use of social media during crises has been explored in a variety of natural and man-made 
crisis situations. Yet, most of these studies have focused exclusively on the communication 
strategies and messages sent by crisis responders. Surprisingly little research has been done on 
how crisis publics (i.e., those people interested in or affected by the crisis) use social media 
during such events. Our article addresses this gap in the context of citizens’ Twitter use during 
the 2011 riots in the UK. Focusing on communications with and about police forces in two cities, 
we analyzed 5,984 citizen tweets collected during the event for content and sentiment. 
Comparing the two cases, our findings suggest that citizens’ Twitter communication follows a 
general logic of concerns, but can also be influenced very easily by single, non-crisis related 
events such as perceived missteps in a police force’s Twitter communication. Our study provides 
insights into citizens’ concerns and communication patterns during crises adding to our 
knowledge about the dynamics of citizens’ use of social media in such times. It further highlights 
the fragmentation in Twitter audiences especially in later stages of the crisis. These observations 
can be utilized by police forces to help determine the appropriate organizational responses that 
facilitate coping across various stages of crisis events. In addition, they illustrate limitations in 
current theoretical understandings of crisis response strategies, adding the requirement for 
adaptivity, flexibility and ambiguity in organizational responses to address the observed 
plurivocality of crisis audiences.
Keywords: Twitter, social media, crisis, crisis communication, police, citizens’ comments
21. INTRODUCTION
Crises of all types, be they caused by natural hazards or by man-made situations, are 
characterized by threat, urgency and uncertainty (Rosenthal et al., 1989). In these situations it is 
vital for citizens to obtain clear information on events and direction for action, as well as 
assurance of their safety. Otherwise, social unrest and a breakdown of public order are possible, 
as was tragically demonstrated, for instance, in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans in 2005 (Nelson et al, 2010). Communication between crisis response organizations and 
the public is, therefore, essential for coping with crises. Conversely, responders’ failures in 
addressing a crisis have often to do with communication-related challenges (Allen et al., 2014; 
Fisher et al., 2016; Van Gorp et al., 2015). 
Numerous studies have therefore aimed to understand how crises responders do and should 
communicate with affected citizens (e.g., Mergel, 2014; Takahashia, et al., 2015; Wukich & 
Mergel, 2015). The opposite view – crisis communication by citizens with and about crises 
responders – has received considerably less attention (Pang & Ng, 2016). This one-sided view is 
problematic, as the ways crisis communication is accomplished is shifting, primarily due to the 
growing role of social media during crisis events. 
Social media, including networking sites such as Facebook and microblogging services such as 
Twitter, afford quick, efficient and widespread distribution of multiple-source information, 
warnings and calls for action, as well as the collection of information to improve situational 
awareness (Wukich, 2015). The use of social media during crises represents a shift in crisis 
communication from the mere transmission of a message to interaction between organizations 
and the public. As Wukich (2015) phrased it, “the public becomes a much more active and 
potentially empowered participant in the event, as opposed to a passive receiver of responder-
3produced messages” (p. 132). It is therefore important to understand communicative behaviors of 
crises publics, as this provides vital knowledge for crisis responders on how to effectively 
prepare, shape and manage communications during ongoing crisis events (Brummette & Fussell 
Sisco, 2015).
Using the well-studied case of the 2011 UK riots, our interest in this paper focused on citizens’ 
Twitter communications with and about police forces to better understand the usage of the 
medium and the changing concerns of publics voiced through social media throughout a crisis 
event. We focus on Twitter, as this fast-paced short-messaging service is one of the most 
frequently adopted social media platforms by police forces (and first responders more generally) 
for all phases of crisis management. In our study, we concentrate on the stage of crisis response 
(Coombs, 2012) given that the UK riots were a public disorder event in which the use of Twitter 
followed the sudden escalation of disorder. According to Panagiotopoulos et al. (2016), these 
types of events do not give the opportunity to observe a pre-crisis stage, which differentiates 
them from, for example, natural hazards. Further, we focus on police, as police organizations are 
a primary player in nearly all forms of crisis situations standing at the forefront of efforts to keep 
‘law and order’ during tense and often chaotic times. Police forces are thus often the most visible 
representatives of a government and its ability to react to and manage crisis events.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we review the literature 
on crisis communication and on social media as a crisis communication channel. Next, the study 
context and the research design are explained. Subsequently, we present and discuss the results 
of the fieldwork. Finally, we describe the theoretical and practical implications of our findings in 
answer to our main research questions.
42. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Crisis events and crisis communication
Several terms for crisis exists and have often been used interchangeably (e.g., emergency, 
disaster or catastrophe; Fischer et al., 2016). In this article, we adopt the definition of Kreps 
(1984), who defines crises as “events, observable in time and space, in which societies or their 
larger subunits (e.g., communities, regions) incur physical damages and losses and/or disruption 
of their routine functioning” (p. 312). Crises move through several stages with disparate 
characteristics and requirements for governments and first responders. Lettieri et al. (2009) 
differentiated four stages in a crisis lifecycle: two pre-crisis phases (mitigation and preparedness) 
and two post-crisis phases (response and recovery). Coombs (2012) referred to three phases, 
which overlap with those of Lettieri et al. (2009): pre-crisis (prevention and preparation), crisis 
response (actual response to a crisis), and post-crisis (preparation for the next and commitments 
during the crisis with follow-up information). Crisis response is probably the most critical and 
important phase, as it is highly visible to citizens and significantly influences public opinion and 
what citizens think of responders handling the crisis.
An important component of crisis management is crisis communication. During a critical event, 
communication serves multiple purposes from information collection to coordination, 
information dissemination, planning for and management of a crisis, but also relationship 
building (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). According to Terp Søland (2016), during crises “a 
legitimacy gap may occur if there is a perceived discrepancy between an organization’s actions 
and society’s expectations. Such a gap can threaten both the image and reputation of an 
organization” (p. 7). Effective crisis communication can help preventing or closing such gaps, 
restoring the legitimacy and reputation of crisis responders (Coombs & Holladay, 2014), 
particularly when their image has been damaged as a result of the crisis itself (Schultz et al., 
52011). The role of communication for responders’ reputation and legitimacy are of such 
importance to organizations that an extensive body of knowledge concerned with crisis 
communication has developed, and several theoretical approaches for responding to crises exist 
within the literature. Two of the most important ones are Image Repair Theory (Benoit, 1995) 
and Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2009). 
According to Benoit’s Image Repair Theory (1995, 1997), organizations involved in crisis events 
are liable to receive attacks from the public. Such attacks or complaints have two components: 
the accused is held responsible for an action and that act is considered offensive. Because both 
the image of an organization and the threat to that image are perceptual, effective communication 
may mitigate such threats. Consequently, Image Repair Theory focuses on the content of crisis 
communication messages and presents five broad categories of image repair strategies (i.e., 
communication strategies): denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of the event, 
corrective action, and mortification. These strategies are grounded in a belief that communication 
(words and actions) affects how the public perceives the organization involved in the crisis 
(Coombs, 2014) and can thus be actively used in shaping and changing such perceptions.
Benoit’s Image Repair Theory has received wide criticism. Of particular importance is the fact 
that the author ignores the contextual background of organizations and crises, as his theory 
builds on a rhetorical tradition, which emphasizes the spoken or written word rather than the 
environment and the context (Skriver Jensen, 2014). 
Opposite Benoit’s theory, Coombs’s theory is primarily context-oriented and based on public 
relations (Coombs, 2009). Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) explains how 
communication protects an organization’s reputation during a crisis, but goes one step further 
than Image Repair Theory by linking crisis response strategies and elements of the crisis 
6situation (Bell, 2010). On the one hand, the theory predicts reputational threat through three 
factors: initial crisis responsibility, crisis history, and prior relational reputation. On the other 
hand, it recognizes that crisis response strategies vary depending on the type of crisis and the 
stakeholder’s attribution of responsibility (see Table 1), which results in four communication 
strategies adjusted to different crises and publics (Skriver Jensen, 2014; Bell, 2010): denial, 
diminishment, rebuilding, and bolstering (Coombs, 2009).
Table 1. Crises types by level of responsibility (Source: Coombs, 2014: 150)
Victim cluster: Very little attribution of responsibility
Natural disasters
Rumors
Workplace violence
Malevolence
Accidental cluster: Low attribution of responsibility
Challenges
Technical-error accidents
Technical error-product harm
Preventable cluster:  Strong attribution of responsibility
Human-error accidents
Human error-product harm
Organizational misdeeds
Despite the contributions of these two theories to the field of crisis communication, both Coombs 
and Benoit focus primarily on the sender, which is why they neglect the receivers’ perception of 
the sender’s stimuli choice of strategy. Further, they pay limited attention to the active role of 
citizens: both focus squarely on organizational communication and do not recognize that crisis 
communication may consist of communicative actions between several senders and receivers 
(Johansen & Frandsen, 2007). This reduces their potential to guide organizations in shaping as 
well as adjusting and flexibly reacting to (potential) shifts in communications by crisis publics. 
Only recently, SCCT’s researchers have begun to examine how crisis publics communicate 
during crisis events. These discussions shift the focus to the receiver (Coombs & Holladay, 2006; 
72009; 2012; 2014), building on the concept of the rhetorical arena (Frandsen & Johansen, 2007), 
where crisis responses emanate from different types of actors, including the public: “the 
rhetorical arena considers the voices of any actors trying to communicate about the crisis as 
crisis communicators. From this perspective, multiple voices can attempt to influence crisis 
publics, not just the one, organizational voice. A rhetorical arena opens around a crisis. Various 
actors enter into this arena by engaging in communication about a crisis or potential crisis” 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2014, p. 42).
Under this view, communications of crisis publics play two meaningful roles (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2014): on the one hand, they can indicate whether or not the crisis response messages 
have been accepted; on the other hand, the public’s messages are important in shaping 
organizational reputation and legitimacy and thus the possibility of these organizations to act as 
effective crisis responders in current but also future crises. In Coombs and Holladay’s words: 
“unfavorable comments can increase the reputational damage, while favorable comments can 
help to mitigate the reputational damage for the organization in crisis” (p. 45). 
Additionally, Skriver Jensen (2014) criticizes that neither theory considers choice of medium; 
i.e., the authors seem to suggest that organizations communicate in the same way across different 
media channels. This is problematic as communication channels differ in important ways, and 
public communication expectations and behaviors certainly in social media have shifted 
compared to more ‘traditional’ media (Skriver Jensen, 2014). 
2.2. Crisis communication on social media
Social media is gaining increasing popularity in the public relations and communication arenas. 
Especially the possibility to easily and openly share and participate in the creation of content 
make them an important communication tool (Lee et al., 2012). Not only can information be 
8disseminated immediately, but social media also enables fast, efficient and cost-effective 
interactions and question-answer scenarios (Veil et al., 2011). This results in a new digital 
environment, in which peer discussion or a “many-to-many” model replaces the “one-to-many” 
model encouraged by traditional media (Wukich & Mergel, 2015). The pervasive nature of social 
media culture further dictates that information flows are constant, interactive and involve users 
as message actors, agents, and creators (Stewart & Gail Wilson, 2016). Hence, citizens become 
both consumers and active contributors of information shifting the dynamics of their interactions 
with organizations. According to Currie (2009), the main emphasis is no longer on organizations 
talking to their publics, but publics talking back to the organizations and, most importantly, 
publics talking to each other. This makes social media an attractive tool for crisis management.  
The use of social media for crisis communication has been explored across a variety of natural 
and man-made crisis situations from hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods to the aftermath of the 
2013 Boston marathon bombings and the 2015 Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris (e.g., Cassa et al., 
2013; Hughes et al., 2014; UK Cabinet Office, 2012; Yates & Paquette, 2011). Also, the public’s 
use of social media during a crisis to ask for help or simply for creating personal situational 
awareness is well documented (Baker, 2012; Li et al., 2014; Takahashia et al., 2015; Tapia et al., 
2014). These experiences demonstrate that social media as a communication channel can provide 
crucial services for first responders during as well as in the aftermath of crises events. No 
wonder therefore that social media, and particularly Twitter, has been widely adopted during 
crises and for emergency response by first responders and citizens alike (e.g., Gaspar et al., 2016, 
Panagiotopoulos et al. 2014; Shih et al., 2015; Simon et al., 2015). 
However, social media might be seen as a double-edge sword, adding complexity to crisis 
management (Ott & Theunissen, 2015). As an example, the limited information in a tweet can 
9make it difficult to identify its meaning and context, and the massive volume of messages 
challenges crisis responders to quickly analyze incoming information and to make efficient 
decisions based on the analysis (Hughes et al., 2014). Also, the combination of speed and virality 
can present an unprecedented vulnerability (Lillqvist & Salminen, 2014), as rumors and false 
information spread quickly and easily, and users often prefer to spread the negative and dramatic 
instead of the factual (Li et al., 2014; Starbird et al., 2014; Wendling et al., 2013). In addition, 
Mulder et al. (2016) found that a focus on social media communication during crises may create 
or sustain social inequalities and lead to the inefficient distribution of resources: in one case, less 
threatened but more vocal urban communities received more help than poorer but less vocal rural 
communities despite the latter’s greater objective need. Citizens and their use of social media 
thus have an important – supportive as well as complicating – role when it comes to crisis 
communication efforts; a role that is vital to understand if first responders want to react and 
interact efficiently throughout crisis events.
Yet, despite the relevance of crisis publics and their communicative choices and reactions on 
social media, most of the literature in the field of crisis communication and on the use of social 
media during crises has focused on the communication strategies, processes and messages of the 
organizations involved in the crisis, prioritizing the sender’s perspective (Benoit, 2015; Liu et al., 
2011; Pang & Ng, 2016; Schultz et al., 2011). Thus, the function of the public in shaping crisis 
discourses remains underexplored and undertheorized. Our study addresses this gap by analyzing 
the sentiments and content of Twitter messages sent by citizens during the 2011 UK riots. Our 
objective is to shed light on how citizens use Twitter over the course of a crisis event in relation 
to first responders such as police forces leading to new insights for the planning and 
implementation of effective and adaptive crisis communication. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. The 2011 UK riots: A short description of events 
On Thursday August 4th, 2011 Mark Duggan, 29, was shot dead by the police in Tottenham in 
the Greater London area, during an operation aimed to arrest him. Questions about whether or 
not Duggan shot first and whether the fatal shot had been an act of self-defense by police started 
a debate that put the police actions into question. On Saturday evening, August 6th, a crowd of 
about 300 people gathered at a police station. What started as a peaceful demonstration turned 
into a forceful riot that spread in the following days across neighborhoods and to other cities 
such as Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester (Briggs, 2012). Buildings were set on fire and 
stores were looted. Thousands of people were arrested. Five people died and over 200 people 
injured; 186 of them police officers. In London alone, 3,443 riot-related crimes were reported, 
which caused damages of over 200 million pounds.1 Throughout the riots, UK police forces used 
social media, and especially the micro-blogging service Twitter, extensively to reach out to the 
public (Crump, 2011). Twitter was also used extensively by citizens throughout the events 
offering a window into their sentiments and concerns, as well as their interactions with and about 
police forces over this period.
3.2. Data collection
To investigate citizens’ Twitter communication with and about police forces during the riots we 
decided to focus on two police forces, the Metropolitan Police in London (MET) and the Greater 
Manchester Police (GMP). The choice of these two forces was deliberate due to the very 
disparate approaches to crisis communication as identified by Denef et al. (2013). They found 
that the two police forces differed considerably in their tone and formality as well as in how they 
1 See, among others, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/london-riots-more-than-2000-people-
185548, http://reut.rs/peJcRx and http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/08/09/f-ukriots-faq.html. 
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reacted to questions, requests and information sent by the public: MET, on the one hand, adopted 
an unidirectional, formal and impersonal approach; GMP, on the other hand, used a highly 
personalized and informal style that included direct and personal interactions with citizens. The 
decision to select these two forces was thus based on principles of theoretical sampling (Yin, 
2009): concentrating on MET and GMP allowed us to compare two police forces with different 
approaches to Twitter communication during the same event, providing a potentially broader 
perspective on citizens’ communications with and about police.
As data basis we collected citizens’ tweets in the period from August 6th-14th, which specifically 
addressed these two police forces. In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of citizens’ 
communication with and about the two police forces we included follower tweets as well as 
tweets from ‘unaffiliated’ Twitter users. To handle the large amount of messages we collected 
tweets using social media analysis service peoplebrowsr.com. We searched for messages 
addressed to @metpoliceuk and/or @gmpolice in the specified time window (August 6th-14th). 
We excluded forwarded messages (retweets), as they did not contain new information. This led 
to a set of 5,984 citizen tweets that we stored in a custom database. Next to the original tweet 
text we stored the timestamp of when the tweet was sent (day and time), the handle of the 
Twitter user and the recipient of the tweet (MET, GMP or both). This corpus constituted the 
basis for all subsequent analyses.
3.3. Preparation of the data: Coding of tweets
To understand citizens’ communication, we coded all collected tweets on the sentiment they 
expressed towards police as well as their content. Each of the 5,984 tweets was thus coded twice: 
once for how positively or negatively they referred to police (sentiment coding), once for their 
topic (content coding). All coding was conducted manually by the authors.  
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To differentiate sentiments towards the police we used a scheme of five categories: supportive, 
critical, ambivalent, neutral, and unclear. The five categories were operationalized as follows:
Supportive tweets: tweets portraying police in a positive light and/or expressing a positive 
attitude towards police actions or the police as organization (e.g., All the praise in the 
world for our brave emergency services!! The country is behind you!! @LondonFire 
@metpoliceuk @Ldn_Ambulance @gmpolice).
Critical tweets: tweets portraying police in a negative light and/or expressing a 
negative/critical attitude towards police actions or the police as organization (e.g., 
@gmpolice @name Police state! Police brutality!).
Ambivalent tweets: tweets that commented on police actions or the police organization, 
but mentioned positive and negative aspects in the same tweet leading to ambivalence in 
the sentiment (e.g., Unimpressed with the (lack of) @gmpolice presence as the looters 
ran riot. The follow up op seems to be efficient and merciless though.).
Neutral: The tweet did not express a sentiment (positive or negative) about the police 
force (e.g., @gmpolice why all the sirens down chester road, stretford?).
Unclear: The tweet did not provide enough information to make a judgment about its 
sentiment with respect to police (e.g., @name You're an idiot. @metpoliceuk).
In a second step, we coded the same tweets for their content. The topics were inductively 
developed through open coding in several rounds of coding and consolidation discussions 
amongst the authors to systematically identify and classify emerging themes (Krippendorff, 
2013). This process led to a set of 29 higher-order topics, which fell into five themes: 1) general 
comments about police, 2) comments on police activities, 3) comments on police communication 
on Twitter, 4) comments directed to co-citizens (i.e., not directed to police) and 5) non-riot 
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related comments. Unclear tweets were coded using a rest-category. The final set of themes and 
topics is presented in Table 2 together with examples from our data.
Table 2. Topics identified in citizen tweets
THEME 1: GENERAL COMMENTS
Topics Example
1. General praise  @gmpolice keep up the amazing work, bad guys never win!!!! :-)
2. General critique  @name @gmpolice Sad to say but policemen ARE like that.
3. Caring 
@metpolice bring in the army, you guys need some backup out there, 
you shouldn't have to fight this war on your own!! #bringinthearmy
4. Thanks 
I think we all owe @gmpolice & @metpoliceuk a HUGE thank you 
this week.
5. Insult/ridicule @gmpolice arrest yourselves.
6. Threat 
Hey, @metpoliceuk bribes u took 4 global phone hacking make u a 
criminal organization, you will be closed #Anonymous
7. Riot is police fault
@name @name @metpoliceuk no i think you'll find it's the police 
who've been inciting disorder
8. Situational comments
@gmpolice I'd really hoped as the city of manchester, we could have 
risen above such vile and pathetic behaviour.
9. Force-comparison I think the Met have a lot to learn from forces like @gmpolice
THEME 2: COMMENTS ON POLICE ACTIVITIES
10. Praise of activities @metpoliceuk hurrah! Well done. X
11. Critique of activities 
@name @gmpolice seems heavy handed, contradicts policy 
http://t.co/cPCmvvX 
12. Way of operating 
@metpoliceuk There clearly are not enough police officers, fire 
engines to restore order, Order a curfew #londonriots #ukriots
13. Request for information @gmpolice How is King Street? Any further damage?
14. Offer to help @gmpolice anything we can do to help? #manchesterriots
15. Request for performance 
@metpolice I don't care about exact number of arrests - put a stop to 
this NOW please. From a taxpayer #hackney
16. Disbelief information
@name: RT @metpoliceuk: Police have not requested a  
#mediablackout and are continuing to provide updates < Liars 
17. Question integrity 
[name] (2) Which raises the question whether @gmpolice accept the 
principle of the presumption of innocence.
18. Question justice/activities
@gmpolice Yes, he probably did something truly heinous. Like 
littering.
19. Police violence/abuse 
And yet try standing in the street to make a valid political point and 
@metpoliceuk will come down on you like a ton of bricks. #ukriots
20. Question competence @gmpolice just hashtag it ‘EducatedGuess’
21. Protection of co-citizens
@name @name @name @gmpolice [name] had nothing to do with the 
looting he was on his way home from blackpool
14
Table 2 (continued).
THEME 3: COMMENTS ON TWITTER COMMUNICATION BY POLICE
22. Way of communication 
@gmpolice use tweeters initials to sign off. Then we get the change of 
tone x Jo
23. Praise of communication
Amazing use of tech RT:@metpoliceuk: Help us identify London 
troublemakers on our Flickr pages [link]
24. Critique of 
communication
@gmpolice Give the swashbuckling a rest.
25. Information on IT issues @metpoliceuk link not working :-(
THEME 4: COMMENTS DIRECTED AT OTHER CITIZENS
26. Information exchange 
amongst citizen
@name @gmpolice << what did they say mate?
27. Request to  
support/respect police 
Please help the @gmpolice any way you can to bring the criminals to 
justice #riots
28. Defense against critique
So @metpoliceuk shoot a dangerous criminal with a gun and its their 
fault??? I think not... #tottenham
THEME 5: NON-RIOT RELATED
29. Non-riot
Fill in the @gmpolice survey about how they police football matches 
and you could win tickets to see England at Wembley [link] 
REST CATEGORY
(Unclear) @gmpolice It clearly was!
4. FINDINGS
Our analysis of citizens’ Twitter communication with and about the two police forces yielded 
interesting similarities as well as differences in the development of sentiments and content of 
tweets over the course of the riots. To provide a clear picture of each case, we detail citizens’ 
communications throughout the riots for each police force separately.
4.1. Citizens’ communication with and about MET police 
The riots in London started on August 6th and wound down around August 14th. Hence, our 
analysis window for citizens’ communication around MET police covers these nine days. Figure 
1 shows how the tone of citizens’ tweets changed over this period. Considering sentiments per 
day (left side of Figure 1), the majority of tweets on the first day were of a critical nature (34.8% 
of tweets sent on this day; e.g., “Just seen live pics of @metpoliceuk response in #Enfield! Are 
you looking for a war? If anything will bring out everyone with a grudge…”) compared to 26.1% 
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of tweets with a supportive and 21.7% of tweets with a neutral character. This picture changed 
considerably over the course of events. Critical tweets decreased to only 6.9% of tweets (August 
10th), but climbed back to nearly the previous level on the last day of our analysis period. In the 
same time, neutral tweets showed a sharp rise and drop, while supportive tweets consistently 
increased over time. On the last day of our analysis period, supportive, neutral and critical tweets 
appeared to nearly equal proportions (33.6%, 25.9% and 33.6%, respectively). If we consider the 
total amount of citizen tweets during the event (right side of Figure 1), we get a similar picture, 
with most critical tweets sent in the early days of the riots, the majority of positive tweets during 
the later days and most neutral tweets in the intermediate period.
Figure 1. Change of sentiments in citizen tweets over the course of the riots: MET police 
To understand these shifts in sentiments, we took a closer look at the topics of citizens’ tweets 
over time. Figure 2 presents the changes in topics grouped for sentiment (left side) and content 
(right side). The majority of initial, critical messages about the riots on August 6th focused on the 
reason for the riots – suggesting that the riots may be the fault of MET police (e.g., 
“@metpoliceuk “communication doesn't work with these thugs” (thugs in uniform) - This is why 
people have to take to the streets. #tottenham”) – but also their initial handling by MET police 
(e.g., questioning competence, integrity or justice of actions, e.g., “@metpoliceuk GREAT! 
Totally reactive - why so little proactivity?!? #ukriots”). These critical messages can be 
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interpreted as an effort of sense-making by citizens about the cause of the riots and their fast 
escalation (with the rioting starting around 8:20, fire services reported 49 ‘primary’ fires in 
Tottenham only 25 minutes later ), as well as a sign of the helplessness felt in the face of the 
events. On the other hand, citizens also sent messages of praise and caring: “@metpoliceuk you 
don't need this now but sending thoughts and support to all officers out this evening. Heroic 
every one”. The early Twitter reaction of citizens thus fell largely into two factions: a larger part 
critical to hostile towards MET, the other voicing empathy and support. Questions about MET’s 
competence remained one of the most frequently voiced critiques throughout (Figure 2 bottom), 
although overall critical voices decreased during the middle days of the riots (cp. Figure 1).
Instead, neutral and crisis related tweets became the majority of tweets sent per day. Their main 
purpose were requests for performance; either as general calls for action (e.g., “@mepoliceuk 
Doooo something!”) or as specific pointers for police to act on (e.g., “@metpoliceuk A looter 
poses with his swag. Please RT. Bring him to justice! [link]”). The main focus thus shifted from 
police as ‘suspect’ of causing the riots to the main actor responsible for ‘sorting it out’. Such 
requests signal the need of citizens to see police actively handle the crisis and were the most 
frequent type of crisis related and neutral tweets during the height of the riots (71.0% and 68.1%, 
respectively, of tweets sent per day). 
In the final stage and the aftermath of the riots (August 12th-14th), calls for performance declined 
and additional topics emerged more prominently. To the extent that police made arrests on the 
streets and reported them online, the tone shifted to the positive – praising MET’s work (“Keep 
up the good work @metpoliceuk #londonriots your doing great job :-)”) as well as specific 
police actions (“@metpoliceuk The Met has now arrested 1401 people in connection with 
violence, disorder and looting.808 of these have been charged -- Awesome”). At the same time, 
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critical tweets became more prevalent again. As during the initial days, they mostly voiced 
concerns around the integrity of MET police and their actions as well as their potential role in 
aggravating the riots: 
“@metpoliceuk and where were the police? Standing back to allow disorder to justify 
cuts. Sick. Not in gangstaspeak, plain disgusting way.”
“[name] @metpoliceuk Charging a small towns worth of people wont solve the problems 
that *actually* created these unconscious feelings.”
“@name That'd be mainly @metpolice If they had sorted this lawlessness out in first two 
days this wouldn't have spread elsewhere!.”
In the aftermath of the riots citizens’ messages thus turned back to sense-making about the riots 
and discussion about the reasons for their emergence and spread. Yet, also non-riot related tweets 
resurfaced again, demonstrating a shift of attention away from the riots to other issues (e.g., 
“youtube.com/[…] via @youtube please watch this video cars blocking the hard shoulder after 
accident on m1 @hantspolice @metpolice”).
Overall, in the case of MET, the attention of citizens and their communication on Twitter 
followed a clear pattern of initial efforts for sense-making of the riot’s causes followed by 
universal calls for action. In the final stages, critical and supportive voices appeared to nearly 
equal measure again, continuing the discussion on blame as well as simple relief and gratefulness 
for MET’s actions and presence. Interesting to observe is that Twitter related messages were 
very rare throughout the events (cp. Figure 3), indicating that citizens spent little time 
commenting or reflecting on MET’s Twitter communication. If citizens commented, they mostly 
criticized MET’s communication style (e.g., “@metpoliceuk do you have to say 'public disorder' 
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rather than riot??") or more generally their way of communicating (e.g., “Apart from that 
@MetPoliceUK haven't really tweeted much”).
Figure 2. Topics of citizens’ tweets over the course of the riots (% of tweets per day): MET 
police
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Figure 3. Changes in content of citizen tweets over the course of the riots: MET police 
4.2. Citizens’ communication with and about GMP police
The riots reached Manchester on August 9th, three days after their onset in London.  Hence, our 
analysis of citizens’ communication around GMP police covered the period from August 9th-14th. 
Figure 4 presents the development of sentiments in citizens’ tweets over this time. As this first 
view illustrates, citizens’ communication with and about GMP differed somewhat from messages 
sent to and about MET police. Most notable is the low percentage of critical tweets (avg. 13.5% 
of tweets sent per day vs 23.5% for MET; cp. Figures 4 and 1). Also, while criticism of the MET 
police was more common at the beginning and during the last two days, in the case of GMP 
police critical tweets appeared primarily towards the end of the riots, but they never reached the 
level of supportive messages. Most tweets in the early days were neutral (e.g., “@gmpolice I am 
glad Manchester is OK, is all well in the other 9 boroughs of Greater Manchester?”), while the 
citizens’ tone in the middle days appeared mostly supportive (e.g., “@gmpolice Well done GMP 
- you work hard and there isn't enough appreciation!”). Interesting is further a view at the 
distribution of tweet volume over time (Figure 4, right sight): the majority of messages (74.6%) 
was sent on only one day, August 13th.
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Figure 4. Change of sentiments in citizen tweets over the course of the riots: GMP police
To understand this picture, it is again indicative to look at the content of citizens’ 
communication. The positive sentiments were primarily driven by a high level of general praise 
for GMP police throughout the period (cp. Figure 5 top; “@gmpolice keep up the good work 
lads! Behind the cause 100 percent!!!”). Toward the end of the riots, the focus of supportive 
tweets shifted towards praise of communication and positive comments about GMP’s use of 
Twitter (e.g., “I'm so impressed by the attitude of @gmpolice in relation to SN. They've used the 
positive aspects of Twitter to enormous benefit for all”). A similar observation can be made for 
critical tweets: the increase of critical messages was not due to a critique of actions on the 
ground, but due to negative comments about GMP’s use of Twitter (e.g., “I think @gmpolice 
should stop bragging about the number of arrests they've made & remember that these are 
people's lives. It's not a sport”; cp. Figure 5 bottom). More generally, citizens’ tweets contained 
a much higher number of comments about GMP’s Twitter use compared to messages sent to or 
about MET (avg. 26.6% of tweets per day vs 4.7%, respectively). 
One explanation to this different pattern lies in the differences in styles used by the two police 
forces (Denef et al., 2013): MET used a more formal approach, while GMP preferred an informal 
style. This more informal approach split opinions of citizens: some found the approach 
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refreshing (e.g., “@gmpolice think it's fantastic that you are engaging with the public like this. 
Shows the human side of policing”) and others found it inappropriate for a police force (e.g., 
“Detached and professional’ is want I want to see from a police twitter account - upholding the 
law, not expressing an opinion @gmpolice”). These different views led also to discussion 
amongst citizens about the proper use of Twitter by police forces during riots. 
GMP’s informal style was also the reason behind the high volume of messages on August 13th as 
well as the shift in content from crisis related to Twitter related tweets (Figures 5 and 6). On this 
day GMP sent the following tweet: “Mum-of-two, not involved in disorder, jailed for FIVE 
months for accepting shorts looted from shop. There are no excuses”. Although the ‘mum-of-
two’ tweet was only one of many informal tweets by GMP (e.g., commenting on offenders’ 
sentences or threating (potential) looters; “Captured lots of criminals on CCTV - we will identify 
you and we will be coming for you”), this specific tweet was seen by many citizens as offensive 
and caused intense negative reactions. The ensuing barrage of critique as well as subsequent 
arguments amongst citizens to accuse or excuse the GMP-tweet saw the volume of tweets rise 
from 135 on the previous day to 1,901 on August 13th. Thus, for some time considerable space 
was taken up on a discussion about GMP’s Twitter account, instead of communicating about the 
riots or supporting police in their duties on the street (cp. Figure 6 left). 
Interestingly enough, the spike in messages was not only due to a high volume of Twitter related 
tweets (praising, criticizing or commenting on GMP’s use of Twitter); instead, tweets across all 
categories increased to a nearly equal measure (cp. Figure 6 right side). The discussion around 
the tweet thus seemed to have caused a rise in citizens’ interest around the functioning of GMP 
more generally. However, only a day later, the volume of citizens’ tweets had decreased to a 
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similar level as prior to August 13th, demonstrating how fast citizens’ attention shifted away from 
the incident.
Other aspects in citizens’ communications showed a similar pattern as observations made in the 
MET case. As with tweets directed at MET, citizens’ crisis related tweets during the initial days 
of the riots focused primarily on requesting performance (cp. Figure 5; e.g., “@gmpolice we 
want to see more crooks arrested”) and to a lesser extent on requesting information (e.g., 
“@gmpolice thanks I just like to know if its peaceful in my area these riots make me nervous if 
you know what I mean”). Towards the end of the crisis, citizens’ focus became again broader 
also questioning justice of activities and competence of the police force, praising their activities 
or starting to write about non-riot related issues. 
Figure 5: Topics of citizens’ tweets over the course of the riots (% of tweets per day): GMP 
police
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Figure 6: Changes in content of citizen tweets over the course of the riots: GMP police
5. DISCUSSION
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Our study aimed to shed light on changes in citizens’ communication in terms of sentiment and 
content over the duration of a crisis. Analyzing citizens’ tweets directed at or speaking about two 
disparate police forces during the 2011 UK riots, we found considerable similarities in the 
development of sentiments and content across the two cases from their onset to the final days of 
the riots. Taken together, our observations across both cases suggest that citizens’ concerns seem 
to follow a ‘general logic’ with shifts in the type of topics citizens find relevant and pay attention 
to throughout the duration of crisis events. Further, we found that citizens actively engaged with 
police forces about their way of handling the crisis, but also addressed broader issues on the 
perceived justice of actions as well as their overall competence and integrity. These critical 
voices were most visible in the very early stage and the last phase of the riots. 
Early and late stages of a crises can thus be seen as especially vulnerable times for police forces, 
in which citizens aim to make sense about the crisis and the role of police in the events: at the 
beginning, in terms of framing the crises as the organization’s fault; in the final stages by 
critically reviewing the effectiveness and ethics of actions and communications. These 
observations add a dynamic perspective to existing crisis communication models. Prevalent 
models, such as Image Repair Theory (Benoit, 1995, 1997) and Situational Crisis 
Communication Theory (Coombs, 2009). tend not to theorize potential changes in the emotions 
and needs of crisis audiences. Our study suggests that content and sentiments of communications 
change in systematic ways over the duration of a crisis event, which will require adaptation of 
organizations’ reactions and crisis communication strategies. 
The need for a more dynamics view is also borne out by a second important observation from 
our study: the strong fragmentation of voices into nearly equal parts supportive, neutral and 
critical messages at the end of the crisis period in both cases, and for MET also at the beginning 
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of the riots. This fragmentation emphasizes the plurality of opinions and concerns in crisis 
publics (Webster & Ksiazek, 2012) and supports the existence of a rhetorical arena in which 
crisis communication emanates from a multitude of groups (Frandsen & Johansen, forthcoming; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2014). Their often contradictory opinions and concerns need to be 
addressed in a competent manner. Instead of choosing one singular response strategy such as 
denial, mortification or bolstering (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2009), our study indicates that 
organizations need agility to address the plurality of audiences present on social media and the 
subsequent multitude of concerns and attitudes voiced at the same time. Organizations thus 
require agility in their crisis communication strategies over time as well as across audiences. 
A third important observation was the episode around the ‘mum-of-two’ tweet by GMP. This 
incident dramatically changed the communication pattern and content of citizen tweets. Using 
Grebe’s (2013) terms, GMP in this instance failed to meet the expectations of the public of what 
was deemed to be an appropriate response message. This episode can be seen as a short social 
media crisis (Coombs, 2014; Coombs & Holladay, 2012; Veil et al., 2011) in the sense that it is 
an event that can harm the organization and arises in or is amplified by social media (Coombs, 
2014). This social media crisis led into a “double crisis” (Johansen & Frandsen, 2007), in which 
the original crisis (the riots) was – during one day – superposed by a communication crisis that 
showed a negative reaction to GMP’s use of Twitter. The resulting reactions made the public 
‘forget’ what the original crisis was about and instead focus on GMP’s communication efforts 
and messages. This incident illustrates the volatile nature of crisis communication on Twitter as 
well as potential challenges of a rather informal communication style during evolving crises, but 
also possibilities for recovering from such blunders.
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Yet, despite the explosive initial reactions, citizens’ attention quickly shifted away again from 
the tweet incident. We believe that this was due to two main reasons: firstly, GMP conducted 
damage control by apologizing and asking for feedback on their communication style. According 
to Benoit’s Image Repair Theory (1995, 1997), GMP used a ‘mortification’ strategy, while under 
Coombs’s Situational Crisis Communication Theory (2009), they used an ‘apology’ to rebuild 
their crisis response. In both cases, the organization takes full responsibility of the incident and 
asks for forgiveness, just as GMP did. These efforts at repairs were received positively by many, 
who lauded GMP for admitting a fault and their willingness to learn. The strategy to apologize 
and openly admit the fault seemed to have been instrumental in calming negative opinions and 
creating a positive view which made attacks by others unreasonable. Our observations support 
previous findings on the use of apologies, such as Schultz et al. (2011)’s, who concluded that 
people are more likely to pass along or react to messages when they are angry about an incident, 
and that apology and sympathy should therefore lead to less negative feelings. The GMP case 
can serve as demonstration that a proactive and engaging, informal approach can work well in 
shaping perceptions of police and their actions, but also showcases its dangers.
Secondly, citizens increasingly started defending GMP against critique of others. The events 
around the tweet thus also demonstrate that citizens can be important allies in the image repair of 
organizations. A considerable group of citizens played an active role in co-shaping and co-
creating positive narratives about both police forces. Neither Image Repair Theory nor 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory have recognized the role of citizens in supporting 
embattled organizations in their efforts to manage their image during and in the aftermath of 
crisis events. We think that here lays considerable potential in extending and refining our 
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understanding of organizational crisis communication and in harnessing citizens in the creation 
or repair of organizational legitimacy during and after crises.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of this article was to shed light on how citizens use Twitter over the course of 
a crisis event in relation to first responders such as police forces leading to new insights for the 
planning and implementation of effective and adaptive crisis communication. Our study 
contributes to the literature on crisis communication by expanding the application of both 
Benoit’s Image Repair Theory and Coombs’s Situational Crisis Communication Theory in two 
specific ways. By examining citizens’ communication with and about police forces on Twitter 
we add citizens’ social media use as an important factor in (co-)shaping organizational image 
and legitimacy that both theories should more often take into account. Our study moreover 
illustrates how citizens employ social media in the sense-making process throughout a crisis and 
how this sense-making and thus the focal concerns shift across the duration of the events. Given 
the reactive nature of Image Repair Theory and Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
communication strategies, our study contributes to these theories by adding a dynamic 
perspective of likely content and sentiment shifts over time. In addition, our study shows that, 
given the fragmentation of citizens’ opinions and concerns, organizations need to handle crisis 
communication strategies flexibly to simultaneously address a variety of (possible) publics. 
Together these insights can be utilized by police forces to help determine the appropriate 
organizational responses that facilitate coping across various stages of a crisis.
5.1. Practical implications
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Our study offers very practical lessons to first responders such as police for a more strategic 
social media communication approach during crises. Firstly, police forces need to competently 
manage the natural fragmentation of their audiences on social media. On the one hand, they 
should aim to amplify the positive and supportive voices to enhance and strengthen online 
support by citizens (e.g., reacting to such messages by thanking the senders). On the other hand, 
the more critical voices can provide important learning and feedback moments for police forces. 
Keeping track of the sentiments as well as the content of citizen tweets throughout an event can 
help reacting quickly to misconceptions (e.g., by quickly providing rationales for actions 
perceived as unjustified) or guide changes in the style, frequency and content of communications 
(e.g., frequency of updates on arrests or localized information on number of officers on the 
ground). 
Critical voices, especially in the sense-making phase in the aftermath of a crises, can further 
provide crucial information about (potential) trust issues and threats to the perceived standing 
and legitimacy of police forces longer term. As Terp Søland (2016) pointed out, crises can 
threaten both the image and reputation of an organization. Our study illustrates that such threats 
go hand in hand with the possibility to be perceived as an effective crisis responder and that such 
fragmentations of opinions may be most likely in the early and later stages of a crisis. We 
therefore propose that reactive strategies, which are the most prevalent strategies in both Benoit’s 
and Coomb’s crisis communication models, should be accompanied by a more proactive 
bolstering posture, intended to build a positive connection between police forces and citizens 
(Coombs, 2014).
During the height of the riots, the fragmentation of opinions nearly disappeared. In these middle 
days, the primary concern of citizens in both cases was police performance on the ground; that is, 
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seeing whether and how police forces handled the crises in concrete ways (number of arrests, 
type of actions taken, presence or absence in certain areas, transparency of communications 
about actions, etc.). For police forces this means that communications in these middle days 
should be based on a bolstering strategy that “reminds” citizens about the organization’s good 
work and that, therefore, strongly focuses on showcasing performance and concrete actions, 
assuaging the need of citizens to see police act (Coombs, 2014). At this point, an active Twitter 
presence can thus be seen as parallel to showing an active presence on the streets (i.e., indicating 
the need for a double focus on ‘boots and tweets’).
The choice of a flexible crisis communication strategy is key to do this successfully. Our results 
show that, in making that choice, context and the circumstances surrounding a crisis episode 
matter (Bell, 2010; Coombs 2009). Thus, for MET, the strategy of information resulted in less 
negative crisis reactions (Coombs & Holladay, 2009), while for GMP, and as a result of the 
social media crisis, an image restoring strategy focused on admitting responsibility and asking 
for forgiveness proved more suitable (Coombs, 2009; Benoit, 1997; Benoit, 1995). Nevertheless, 
due to the fragmentation of audiences, combining different strategies and, therefore, addressing 
the concerns and expectations of several publics, seems to be the most powerful option, 
particularly when that combination includes both reactive/defensive strategies and proactive 
ones. 
Due to its dynamics in terms of sentiments and content, analyzing citizens’ interaction on social 
media during crises further offers a tool for police forces to improve the choice and consequent 
impact of crisis communication strategies. Given the ambiguous nature of opinions in the late 
stages and aftermath of a crisis, as shown in both our cases, the monitoring of social media 
during post-crisis stages seems especially important. An active presence can contribute to 
30
citizens’ sense-making, that is, the attempt to retrospectively create an understanding of what has 
occurred and how to evaluate the role of police forces during the events. Police forces should 
thus refrain from scaling down their social media presence too early to avoid threats to their 
legitimacy in the longer term. 
5.2. Limitations and future research
Our study also has several limitations. We exclusively focused on Twitter during a situation of 
spreading civil unrest. This is a very different situation than, for instance, crises due to 
environmental disasters or terrorist attacks. Hence, in how far our observations also hold for 
other forms of crises and other social media platforms are questions that require further attention. 
Also, future studies need to clarify in how far disparities in online reactions translate into 
different offline behaviors as well as their impact on subsequent crises, a research question that 
could be addressed using the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al., 
1988; Renn et al., 1992). Moreover, it is likely that demographic, societal or local subgroups will 
react differently to crisis communication strategies. It was (at least with the tools in our reach) 
not possible to gather the demographics of Twitter users. Here lays considerable potential for 
more focused enquiries within and across subgroups and therefore for further understanding the 
fragmentation of audiences during unfolding crisis events. Finally, the two police forces started 
on different levels on Twitter, GMP having been considerably more active than MET even 
before the riots. In how far such differences affect citizen reactions during crisis remains another 
research question. 
Still, there are important lessons to be learned from detailed analyses of Twitter messages, as 
such public narratives provide a direct window into reactions of citizens on the web. As our 
observations demonstrate, Twitter can be a fast-paced feedback loop for crises responders such 
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as police during developing crises, not only about their actions on the ground, but also about 
their communicative approach − especially if the organization is willing to be transparent and to 
enter into direct communication with the (online) public. On the other hand, our study also 
demonstrates the possible pitfalls and challenges of taking this route. To make an informed 
decision, crisis responders need to be aware of these respective benefits and challenges of 
disparate communication strategies and the multitude of voices organizations will encounter 
during crisis events. 
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Figure 1. Change of sentiments in citizen Tweets over the course of the riots: MET police 
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Figure 3. Changes in content of citizen Tweets over the course of the riots: MET police 
Figure 4. Change of sentiments in citizen Tweets over the course of the riots: GMP police
Figure 5: Topics of citizens’ Tweets over the course of the riots (% of Tweets per day): 
GMP police
Figure 6: Changes in content of citizen Tweets over the course of the riots: GMP police
Table 1: Crises types by level of responsibility (source: Coombs, 2014: 150)
Victim cluster: Very little attribution of responsibility
Natural disasters
Rumors
Workplace violence
Malevolence
Accidental cluster: Low attribution of responsibility
Challenges
Technical-error accidents
Technical error-product harm
Preventable cluster:  Strong attribution of responsibility
Human-error accidents
Human error-product harm
Organizational misdeeds
Table 2. Topics identified in citizen tweets
THEME 1: GENERAL COMMENTS
Topics Example
1. General praise  @gmpolice keep up the amazing work, bad guys never win!!!! :-)
2. General critique  @[name] @gmpolice Sad to say but policemen ARE like that.
3. Caring 
@metpolice bring in the army, you guys need some backup out there, 
you shouldn't have to fight this war on your own!! #bringinthearmy
4. Thanks 
I think we all owe @gmpolice & @metpoliceuk a HUGE thank you 
this week.
5. Insult/ridicule @gmpolice arrest yourselves.
6. Threat 
Hey, @metpoliceuk bribes u took 4 global phone hacking make u a 
criminal organization, you will be closed #Anonymous
7. Riot is police fault
@[name] @[name] @metpoliceuk no i think you'll find it's the police 
who've been inciting disorder
8. Situational comments
@gmpolice I'd really hoped as the city of manchester, we could have 
risen above such vile and pathetic behaviour.
9. Force-comparison I think the Met have a lot to learn from forces like @gmpolice
THEME 2: COMMENTS ON POLICE ACTIVITIES
10. Praise of activities @metpoliceuk hurrah! Well done. X
11. Critique of activities 
@[name] @gmpolice seems heavy handed, contradicts policy 
http://t.co/cPCmvvX 
12. Way of operating 
@metpoliceuk There clearly are not enough police officers, fire 
engines to restore order, Order a curfew #londonriots #ukriots
13. Request for information @gmpolice How is King Street? Any further damage?
14. Offer to help @gmpolice anything we can do to help? #manchesterriots
15. Request for performance 
@metpolice I don't care about exact number of arrests - put a stop to 
this NOW please. From a taxpayer #hackney
16. Disbelief information
@[name]: RT @metpoliceuk: Police have not requested a  
#mediablackout and are continuing to provide updates < Liars 
17. Question integrity 
[name] (2) Which raises the question whether @gmpolice accept the 
principle of the presumption of innocence.
18. Question justice/activities
@gmpolice Yes, he probably did something truly heinous. Like 
littering.
19. Police violence/abuse 
And yet try standing in the street to make a valid political point and 
@metpoliceuk will come down on you like a ton of bricks. #ukriots
20. Question competence @gmpolice just hashtag it ‘EducatedGuess’
21. Protection of co-citizens
@[name] @[name] @[name] @gmpolice [name] had nothing to do 
with the looting he was on his way home from blackpool
Table 2 (continued).
THEME 3: COMMENTS ON TWITTER COMMUNICATION BY POLICE
22. Way of communication 
@gmpolice use tweeters initials to sign off. Then we get the change of 
tone x Jo
23. Praise of communication
Amazing use of tech RT:@metpoliceuk: Help us identify London 
troublemakers on our Flickr pages http://t.co/v7nk7Fz
24. Critique of 
communication
@gmpolice Give the swashbuckling a rest.
25. Information on IT issues @metpoliceuk link not working :-(
THEME 4: COMMENTS DIRECTED AT OTHER CITIZENS
26. Information exchange 
amongst citizen
@[name] @gmpolice << what did they say mate?
27. Request to  
support/respect police 
Please help the @gmpolice any way you can to bring the criminals to 
justice #riots
28. Defense against critique
So @metpoliceuk shoot a dangerous criminal with a gun and its their 
fault??? I think not... #tottenham
THEME 5: NON-RIOT RELATED
29. Non-riot
Fill in the @gmpolice survey about how they police football matches 
and you could win tickets to see England at Wembley 
http://bit.ly/pSldjJ
REST CATEGORY
(Unclear) @gmpolice It clearly was!
WHAT DO CITIZENS COMMUNICATE ABOUT DURING CRISES? ANALYZING 
TWITTER USE DURING THE 2011 UK RIOTS
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